August 13, 2019


Editorial Reviews. Review. ” Westerhoff’s commentary is lucid, philosophically engaging, and included ample references for the serious student of Indian or. The Dispeller of Disputes This page intentionally left blank The Dispeller of Disputes N¯ag¯arjuna’s Vigrahavy¯avar. The Dispeller of Disputes – Nagarjuna’s Vigrahavyavartani — translated and commented by Jan Westerhoff · A short work by the.

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The view that it is the theory of emptiness which somehow brings it about that all things lack substance is a misunderstanding addressed frequently in the Buddhist philosophical discussion. Inthe manuscript was brought to Beijing and later returned to Lhasa, where it is now kept in the Tibet Museum.

As substance does not exist anywhere here, the sprout is without substance, and since it is without substance it is empty.

The Dispeller of Disputes

The same holds for those things which have been mentioned in connection with the state of things, as well as for those things which are not phenomena of liberation. He supports this by an astrological example. And when there is no apprehension of dependent origination there is no apprehension of the true state of things.

Try the Kindle edition and experience these great reading features: It has to be explained to what this thingless substance belongs. This book is available as part of Oxford Scholarship Online – view abstracts and keywords at book and chapter level. Moreover, no matter is established without a reason.

For it is of course true that if there are truths made true by the world, then truths made true only by a theory appear insubstantial in comparison. The disptes contained in the statement of universal emptiness has to operate on something, and if there is nothing to negate, there will be no negation either.


But neither of these provides the kind of foundation the realist requires.

The Dispeller of Disputes – Hardcover – Jan Westerhoff – Oxford University Press

Furthermore, because your statement exists, there is an inequality as a consequence: He might try to establish the link between having a quality and having it substantially in the following way. The most mundane ones are those of things like chariots, pots, and so forth, which are dependently originated and therefore empty while If it dispels something it does not dispel something dispellwr the same kind, as speech dispels speech.

This is because we should not think of illumination and darkness as two kinds of objects that somehow have to connect to interact with one another, as, for example, water has to connect with salt in order to dissolve it.

If, on the other hand, we use reference to the objects in order to establish the epistemic instruments, as suggested in verse dispuyes, but then need the instruments in order to establish the objects, we have not succeeded in constructing a foundation either, but have ov gone around in a circle in the reverse order.

The Dispeller of Disputes: Nagarjuna’s Vigrahavyavartani

This is also not correct. In fact, the opponent could say more at this point than just stressing that the bhidharmikas themselves consider these phenomena to be substantially auspicious. In this context, supposing that the negation is earlier and the negated, what is lacking substance, later is not successful. Because suffering and its origin are denied, the cessation of suffering is denied. In this case there will be no substance, but even if this is so and there are no substances of things, this does not necessarily have to imply that there are no substances whatsoever.


Extrinsic Substances [10, 60] But perhaps there is a way of squaring a realist semantics with the theory of emptiness. For a discussion of various reactions to this problem, see Westerhoff a: The object is then subsequently touched by light, and thereby becomes visible to us. He cannot claim that the epistemic instruments are essentially establishers, while the epistemic objects are essentially the established.

At the conventional level, we can infer the conventional to be insubstantial, even though it will still appear to us as substantial. There could be other substances, and disputez would then act as the referents of linguistic expressions.

To this extent there is no thing apprehended by perception, the epistemic instrument. It does not apply to all phenomena but only to a special collection, that is, to everything apart from the thesis of universal emptiness. On the other hand, if it does have argumentative power it must be substantial, so that the universal thesis that everything lacks substance has to be false.

Because of its pleasant scent it is mainly used as a perfume. In this case, a convention-based statement would not be able to refute a substantial one. Because what is self-established does not depend on anything else. These objects have their characteristics by nature: When the argument claims that the effect is not separate from the cause and conditions, this does not deny that the sprout is a thing which we can clearly distinguish from other things, such as the seed, the soil, water, and so forth.